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Despite evidence supporting a relationship between impulsivity and naturalistic risk-taking,
the relationship of impulsivity with laboratory-based measures of risky decision-making
remains unclear. One factor contributing to this gap in our understanding is the degree
to which different risky decision-making tasks vary in their details. We conducted an
fMRI investigation of the Angling Risk Task (ART), which is an improved behavioral
measure of risky decision-making. In order to examine whether the observed pattern of
neural activation was specific to the ART or generalizable, we also examined correlates
of the Balloon Analog Risk Taking (BART) task in the same sample of 23 healthy
adults. Exploratory analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between neural
activation, performance, impulsivity and self-reported risk-taking. While activation in a
valuation network was associated with reward tracking during the ART but not the
BART, increased fronto-cingulate activation was seen during risky choice trials in the
BART as compared to the ART. Thus, neural activation during risky decision-making trials
differed between the two tasks, and this observation was likely driven by differences in
task parameters, namely the absence vs. presence of ambiguity and/or stationary vs.
increasing probability of loss on the ART and BART, respectively. Exploratory association
analyses suggest that sensitivity of neural response to the magnitude of potential reward
during the ART was associated with a suboptimal performance strategy, higher scores
on a scale of dysfunctional impulsivity (DI) and a greater likelihood of engaging in risky
behaviors, while this pattern was not seen for the BART. Our results suggest that the ART
is decomposable and associated with distinct patterns of neural activation; this represents
a preliminary step toward characterizing a behavioral measure of risky decision-making
that may support a better understanding of naturalistic risk-taking.
Keywords: functional impulsivity, dysfunctional impulsivity, risky decision-making, naturalistic risk-taking, ART,
BART
INTRODUCTION
Risky decision-making has important implications for under-
standing a number of potentially harmful behaviors, ranging
from those linked to clinical disorders that place a significant bur-
den on both the affected individual and society (e.g., substance
dependence) to behaviors that are not linked to specific diagnoses
but carry potentially adverse outcomes (e.g., fast driving). While
trait impulsivity plays a role in risky decision-making and pre-
dicts naturalistic risk-taking (that is, an individual’s likelihood of
engaging in real-world activities that involve potential negative
outcomes), there is not yet a clear pattern of individual differ-
ences in risky decision-making (as measured behaviorally) and
impulsivity that can predict naturalistic risk-taking. This lack of
understanding is likely driven by the complex nature of decision-
making itself, and the wide variability in behavioral tasks designed
to assess risky decision-making.
In laboratory-based decision-making tasks, participants are
required to choose between two options of varying risk (defined
as variance over possible outcomes with known probabilities)
and/or ambiguity (defined by the uncertainty of outcome prob-
abilities). As reviewed in Schonberg et al. (2011), there is a
further distinction between economic tasks (which have tradi-
tionally been used in neuroeconomics research) and naturalistic
risk-taking tasks. While economic tasks are easily decomposable,
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performance on such tasks is not reliably correlated with natural-
istic risk-taking; in contrast, tasks on which the associated perfor-
mance is correlated with self-reported naturalistic risk-taking do
not generally lend themselves to clean cognitive decomposition.
For example, one laboratory test of naturalistic decision-
making is the Balloon Analog Risk Taking (BART) task (Lejuez
et al., 2002), in which participants inflate a series of simulated bal-
loons and chose between continuing to play (with the increased
probability of a loss) or cashing out (to keep their potential accu-
mulated earnings). Performance on the BART has been associated
with self-reported naturalistic risk-taking, as exemplified by sub-
stance abuse and alcohol-related problems (Lejuez et al., 2002;
Aklin et al., 2005; Skeel et al., 2008; Fernie et al., 2010; Weafer
et al., 2011), although this has not been universally true (Dean
et al., 2011; Courtney et al., 2012). A limitation of this task is
that loss probability is confounded with changing expected value
(as both potential gains and losses, and loss probability, increase
across trials).
In the Angling Risk Task (ART) (Pleskac, 2008), which was
developed to address some of the problems with interpretation of
risk-taking on the BART, participants play in a simulated fishing
tournament and, similar to the instructions on the BART, they
choose between continuing to play vs. cashing out. In one ver-
sion of the ART, the probability of loss is known and constant
across trials, as participants can see the unchanging distribution
of good-to-bad fish in the pond on every trial. This design makes
the task more decomposable than the BART, as the only objec-
tively changing variables are total potential gains and losses. In a
previous study, risk-taking on the ART was associated with self-
reported drug use (Pleskac, 2008), suggesting that this task was
able to maintain the affective features that appear to be essential
for predictive validity of naturalistic risk-taking (Schonberg et al.,
2011).
Here, we set out to investigate the neural correlates of risk-
taking on the ART in a sample of healthy adults and compare
neural activation between ART and BART in order to test the
influence of task parameters on relationships with individual dif-
ference measures. Given the lack of ambiguity as well as the
stationary probability of loss on the ART, we predicted that this
task would be decomposable as evidenced by distinct patterns of
activation (e.g., increased activation in reward-related regions on
increasingly risky trials), while this pattern would be relatively
obscured by the presence of ambiguity (and increasing probability
of loss) on the BART. In follow-up exploratory analyses, we also
examined whether the ART—both in terms of behavior and neu-
ral activation—is also sensitive to individual differences in trait
impulsivity and naturalistic risk-taking. Although our findings of
a pattern of individual differences based on the ART data are lim-
ited by the small sample, our findings of significant differences
between activation elicited during the ART as compared to BART
provide support for the influence of these specific task parameters
on resulting patterns of neural activation.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
All participants were recruited from the Los Angeles area as part
of the Consortium for Neuropsychiatric Phenomics at UCLA
(www.phenomics.ucla.edu), in which they completed extensive
neuropsychological testing. A portion of the sample also took part
in two separate fMRI sessions; data collected during these scan
sessions (which included the BART) are the focus of analyses pre-
sented here. All candidates had telephone screening followed by
additional in-person screening. After receiving a thorough expla-
nation, all participants gave written informed consent according
to the procedures approved by the University of California Los
Angeles Institutional Review Board.
Participants were men or women ages 21–50 years; of the
NIH racial/ethnic category either White, not Hispanic or Latino,
or Hispanic or Latino, of any racial group. Their primary lan-
guage was either English or Spanish, and they had completed
at least 8 years of formal education. They were required to
have no significant medical illness; to be adequately coopera-
tive to complete assessments; and to have visual acuity of 20/60
or better. Participants were excluded if they had lifetime diag-
noses of Schizophrenia or Other Psychotic Disorder, Bipolar
I or II Disorder; or current Major Depressive Disorder, suici-
dality, Anxiety Disorder (Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Panic
Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder), Substance Abuse/Dependence, or ADHD. Diagnoses
followed the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders, Fourth Edition—Text Revision (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000), and were based on the Structured Clinical
Interview for DSM-IV [SCID-I; (First et al., 2004)], supple-
mented by the Adult ADHD Interview. Additional exclusion cri-
teria for participants in the imaging portion of the study included
left-handedness, pregnancy, history of head injury with loss of
consciousness or cognitive sequelae, or other contraindications
to scanning (e.g., claustrophobia, metal in body, body too large to
fit in scanner).
A subsample of the participants that were scanned took part in
a third fMRI session, which included 1 h of behavioral testing and
1 h of scanning on the same day including the ART task. Eligible
English-speaking participants between the ages of 21 and 40 were
recruited from the parent study if they successfully completed all
previous testing sessions. A total of 28 participants were recruited
and completed the third scan session. Of these, 23 were included
in the final analyses [mean age 25.65 years (SD = 4.43), range
21–39; 13 women], after 5 individuals were excluded for failing
to perform either of the tasks as instructed (N = 2), excessive
head motion (exceeding 3mm in any direction) during scanning
(N = 2), or poor quality of the high-resolution anatomical image
collected (N = 1).
fMRI TASKS
Participants performed an fMRI-adapted version of the ART dur-
ing the testing session that is the focus of our primary analysis.
In addition, participants had completed the BART, as part of
the parent study, during a previous scan session. Both the ART
and BART tasks are sequential measures of dynamic risk-taking
behavior and include similar trial types: Risky Choices, Cash-outs
and Losses (with Loss trials defined as loss of accumulated poten-
tial gain). Across trials, participants chose between a sure outcome
(by selecting the Cash-out option and ending the round) and a
risky outcome (by making a Risky Choice and continuing to play
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in the round); as such, the outcome of each round was not pre-
determined. A schematic of each task is presented in Figure 1.
Each task included a series of rounds, each including potentially
multiple Risky Choice trials and ending with either a Cash-out
trial or a Loss trial (that is, each task included a number of rounds,
with each round including multiple trials). Risky Choice trials
(trials in a blue frame in Figure 1) are defined as those in which
the participant chooses to continue playing a round, by either
casting the fishing rod again (ART) or pumping the balloon again
(BART). Cash-out trials (trials in a yellow frame in Figure 1) are
defined as those in which the participant chooses to save the accu-
mulated earnings and end the given round. Loss trials (trials in
a red frame in Figure 1) are defined as those in which the par-
ticipant experiences a loss of potential accumulated earnings (by
either catching the bad fish in the ART or the balloon exploding
in the BART) and mark the end of the given round.
ART
In the ART (Pleskac, 2008), which in its design was based on the
BART, participants were allowed to fish, in the context of a fish-
ing tournament, out of a pond with nine yellow fish and one red
fish (Figure 1A). On each trial, participants chose to fish or cash
out to collect their accumulated earnings for that round. After
a trial in which the participant chose to cast and then caught
a yellow fish, the participant earned $0.01 (which was displayed
on the screen) and was able to cast again as part of that round;
however, if the participant caught a red fish, all earnings for that
round were forfeited, a $0.00 total was displayed, and the next
round began. Alternatively, if the participant chose to cash out,
his or her accumulated earnings for that round were displayed
before the task moved onto the next round. As illustrated in the
top panel of Figure 1A, the potential accumulated earnings on the
fourth trial of this example round was $0.03, after the participant
completed three successful Risky Choice cast trials. The top panel
of Figure 1A represents a Cash-out decision on the fourth trial,
where the participant would then receive the accumulated earn-
ings of $0.03 in the subsequent outcome trial. The bottom panel
of Figure 1A represents a Loss event on the fifth trial, after the
participant completed four Risky Choice trials; the round ends in
a Loss event, with the participant losing all potential accumulated
earnings for that round. In the “sunny day, catch-and-release”
version of the ART used here [rather than other versions of the
task tested by Pleskac (2008)], participants chose to fish out of
a clear pond, meaning that they could see the distribution of
yellow-to-red fish and the distribution of fish remained the same
on every trial. The probability of the participant catching a red
fish on each trial was based on the distribution of red-to-yellow
fish in the pond (one out of ten), meaning that on each trial,
the probability of a loss was explicit and stationary. There was no
limit to the number of trials that could occur within a round. The
task was self-paced: the outcome trial was displayed for a variable
duration (1–3 s, average 2 s). Each trial was separated by presen-
tation of a fixation point for a variable duration (1–3 s, average
2 s); each round was separated by presentation of a fixation for
variable duration (1–12 s, average 4 s).
BART
In the BART (Lejuez et al., 2002), participants were allowed to
pump a series of green (experimental) and white (control) bal-
loons (Figure 1B). On each trial, participants chose to pump the
balloon or cash out and collect their accumulated earnings for
that round. For experimental balloons, after a trial in which the
participant pumped the balloon without an explosion occurring,
an image of a larger balloon was presented, the participant earned
FIGURE 1 | Task Schematic of the (A) Angling Risk Task (ART) and
(B) Balloon Analog Risk Taking task (BART). For both tasks, Risky
choice trials are enclosed in blue, Cash-out trials are enclosed in yellow,
and Loss trials are enclosed in Red; trials are indicated as such for the
purpose of illustration only, and were not colored as such during task
presentation.
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5 points, and was able to pump again or cash-out. After a trial in
which the participant chose to cash out, the accumulated earn-
ings for that round were displayed and the task progressed to
the next round. On an explosion trial (necessarily following a
Risky choice trial), an exploded balloon was pictured, the partic-
ipant received no points for that round, and the task progressed
to the next round. As illustrated in the top panel of Figure 1B,
the potential accumulated points on the fourth trial of this exam-
ple round was 15, after the participant completed three successful
Risky Choice pump trials. The top panel of Figure 1B represents
a Cash-out decision on the fourth trial, where the participant
would then receive the accumulated 15 points in the subse-
quent outcome trial. The bottom panel of Figure 1B represents
a Loss event on the fifth trial, after the participant completed
four Risky Choice trials; the round ends in a Loss event, with
the participant losing all potential accumulated earnings for that
round. In this version of the BART, the number of pumps to
explosion was randomly drawn from a uniform distribution of
numbers from 1 to 12, which was the maximum number of
pumps possible before an explosion or successful end of a round.
Under these conditions, participants experienced the probabil-
ity as non-stationary, as the likelihood of a loss event increased
with each trial in a round, and no information was provided
to subjects about the probability of explosion. Participants also
responded to control balloons, which increased in size on suc-
cessive trials, but were not associated with earning of points and
did not explode. Only data from experimental balloons are pre-
sented below. An outcome trial (following a Cash-out choice or
a Loss event) was displayed for a fixed duration of 2 s. Each
trial was separated by presentation of a blank screen for a vari-
able duration (1–2 s, average 1.5 s); each round was separated
by presentation of a blank screen for variable duration (1–12 s,
average 4 s).
All participants received brief training on each task immedi-
ately before scanning. Each participant viewed the task stimuli
through MRI-compatible goggles, responded with his or her
right hand on an MR-compatible button box in the scanner,
and performed one run of each task while in the scanner. The
presentation and timing of all stimuli and response events were
achieved using Matlab (Mathworks) and the Psychtoolbox (www.
psychtoolbox.org) on an Apple Powerbook. Participants received
earnings based on performance in the ART at the end of their test-
ing session, but did not receive payment for performance on the
BART.
IMAGE ACQUISITION AND ANALYSIS
Data were collected using a 3T Siemens Trio MRI scanner.
For each task run, functional T2∗-weighted echoplanar images
(EPIs) were collected with the following parameters: slice thick-
ness = 4mm, 34 slices, TR = 2 s, TE = 30ms, flip angle = 90◦,
matrix 64 × 64, FOV = 192mm. For the ART, 270 EPIs were
collected; for the BART, 267 EPIs were collected. Additionally,
a T2-weighted matched-bandwidth high-resolution anatomical
scan (same slice prescription as EPI) and MPRAGE were col-
lected. The parameters for MPRAGE were the following: TR =
1.9 s, TE = 2.26ms, FOV = 250, matrix = 256 × 256, sagittal
plane, slice thickness = 1mm, 176 slices.
fMRI DATA ANALYSIS
Analyses were performed using tools from the FMRIB software
library (www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl), version 4.1. The first 2 volumes
from each scan were discarded to allow for T1 equilibrium effects.
For each scan, images for each participant were realigned to com-
pensate for small head movements (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001).
Data were spatially smoothed using a 5-mm, full-width-half-
maximumGaussian kernel. The data were filtered in the temporal
domain using a non-linear high-pass filter with a 66 s cutoff.
A three-step registration process was used in which EPI images
were first registered to the matched-bandwidth high-resolution
scan, then to the MPRAGE structural image, and finally into
standard [Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI)] space, using
non-linear transformations (Andersson et al., 2007a,b).
Standard model fitting was conducted for all subjects. We
modeled the mean activation associated with Risky choice, Loss
and Cash-out and also evaluated how these activations varied
according to reaction time (Risky choice and Cash-out), as well
as the associated reward-value of the current trials (all three trial
types, although Loss trials are not considered here, as Loss was
experienced similarly between tasks and there were few Loss tri-
als in both tasks); for further description of this model set-up,
see Schonberg et al. (2012). The mean activation for each task
was modeled as a 1 s trial at the time of each event for all three
event types. Reaction time (RT) for Risky choice and Cash-out
was modeled using the same onset times as the mean activation,
but the duration was the participant’s RT for the trial of interest.
To preserve the meaning of the mean activation regressor, the RT
regressors were orthogonalized with respect to the mean regres-
sors within event type. Trial values (i.e., potential accumulated
money for ART, potential accumulated balloon points for BART)
for all three events were modeled through a parametrically mod-
ulated regressor (although the parametric Risky choice contrast
is only considered here), again with the same onset, but with
a modulation value determined by the current trial’s potential
accumulated money/points after mean centering over potential
accumulated money/points within the round being evaluated.
Looking at Figure 1A, the parametric regressor for the three Risky
Choice trials in the ART would be weighted by the value pre-
sented below each pond, after mean centering for the average
amount reached in that round; looking at Figure 1B, the para-
metric regressor for the three Risky Choice trials in the BART
would be weighted by the value associated with each Risky Choice
trial, after mean centering over the average amount reached in
that round. As both tasks included a set of trials within a series of
rounds, with each Risky Choice trial associated with an increas-
ing potential accumulated value within a given round, we were
therefore able to examine parametrically modulated activation
for Risky Choice trials. This means that for both ART and BART,
we examined the mean Risky choice, mean Cash-out, and mean
Loss contrasts, as well as the Risky choice Parametric contrast. In
addition, Control trials were modeled separately for the BART.
In all cases, events were convolved with a double gamma
hemodynamic function to create the regressor. Null events were
not modeled and, therefore, constituted an implicit baseline. The
six motion parameters and temporal derivatives of all regressors
were included as covariates of no interest to improve statistical
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sensitivity. For each participant, four contrasts were computed:
Risky choice vs. Null, Risky choice Parametric vs. Null, Cash-out
vs. Null, and Loss vs. Null. As we were primarily interested in the
average activation for each trial separately, and in the relation-
ship between activation during each trial type and our individual
differences measures, we examined contrasts of each trial type
relative to an implicit baseline (i.e., Null). Furthermore, a direct
comparison between trial types given the design of both tasks
is difficult as a round includes multiple Risky Choice trials but
either one Cash-out or one Loss trial, resulting in an unbalanced
number of trials across trial types (see Table 1 for the number of
trials).
Output from the subject-specific analyses was then analyzed
using a mixed-effects model with FLAME. Higher-level analy-
ses included the four group-level contrasts defined at the sub-
ject level, for ART and BART separately. Primary analyses are
focused on the group-level contrasts of the ART. Conjunction
maps were created for Risky choice vs. Null and Risky choice
Parametric vs. Null contrasts in order to identify the regions of
overlapping activation in both tasks. Finally, paired t-tests were
Table 1 | Descriptive statistics of sample demographics and study
measures.
Variable Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Age (years) 25.65 4.43 21.00 39.00
DI 1.48 2.56 0.00 9.00
FI 5.91 2.47 1.00 10.00
DOSPERT total score 98.22 23.21 57.00 146.00
ART: total rounds 25.78 4.00 18.00 30.00
ART: Risky choice trials 112.48 29.51 57.00 158.00
ART: Cash-out trials 11.78 3.98 5.00 19.00
ART: Loss trials 13.96 2.72 8.00 18.00
ART: Mean adjusted
presses
7.22 3.94 2.00 16.83
ART: Total amount earned
(dollars)
0.71 0.20 0.38 1.18
ART: Coefficient of
variation
0.38 0.19 0.08 1.07
ART: Total number
presses
149.91 23.72 106 188
BART: Total rounds 27.61 2.92 22.00 35.00
BART: Risky choice trials 70.43 10.57 55.00 99.00
BART: Cash-out trials 10.09 3.41 2.00 17.00
BART: Loss trials 8.30 3.02 4.00 14.00
BART: Mean adjusted
presses
4.58 1.24 2.23 8.40
BART: Total amount
earned (points)
211.30 52.92 70.00 320.00
BART: Coefficient of
variation
0.27 0.11 0.14 0.60
BART: Total number
presses
143 9.83 122 161
DI, Dysfunctional Impulsivity; FI, Functional Impulsivity; DOSPERT, Domain-
Specific Risk-Taking Scale; ART, Angling Risk Task; BART, Balloon Analog Risk
Task; SD, standard deviation.
conducted to contrast ART vs. BART directly, for each of these
contrasts. All group-level statistics images were thresholded with
a cluster-forming threshold of z > 2.3 and a cluster probabil-
ity of p < 0.05, corrected for whole-brain multiple comparisons
using Gaussian random field theory. The search region included
273,797 voxels for ART and 272,763 voxels for BART. Brain
regions were identified using the Harvard-Oxford cortical and
subcortical probabilistic atlases, and all locations of activations
are reported using MNI coordinates. For visualization of results,
statistical maps were projected onto an average cortical surface
with the use of multifiducial mapping using CARET software
(Van Essen, 2005). For reporting of clusters, we used the cluster
command in FSL. Anatomical localization within each cluster was
obtained by searching within maximum likelihood regions from
the FSL Harvard-Oxford probabilistic atlas to obtain the max-
imum z-statistic and MNI coordinates within each anatomical
region contained within a cluster.
In addition, in order to examine the relationship between
individual differences and activation as measured using fMRI,
we defined two anatomically-based regions of interest [the right
nucleus accumbens (NAcc) and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC)] following inspection of group contrasts, in addition
to an extensive literature supporting the role of these regions in
reward processing (Liu et al., 2011); note that these ROIs were
defined prior to any individual difference analyses on this dataset,
and thus are fully independent. ROIs were defined using the FSL
Harvard-Oxford probabilistic atlas (thresholded at 25%): we used
the existing NAcc mask and created a mask to encompass the
medial PFC by combining Harvard-Oxford regions (frontal pole,
frontal medial cortex, paracingulate gyrus, and subcallosal cor-
tex) falling between x = 14 and x = −14 and z < 0. ROIs were
then used to extract average percent signal change values corre-
sponding to a 1-s stimulus convolved with a double-gamma HRF
from the Risky choice Parametric contrast (following Mumford
and Poldrack, 2007), representing the average across all vox-
els included in the anatomically-defined ROI. In this way, we
restricted our analyses to activation in the ART and BART Risky
choice Parametric contrasts that fell within these anatomically-
defined regions. Percent signal change values were then corre-
lated with our individual differences measures using R statistical
software.
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCE MEASURES FOR EXPLORATORY ANALYSES
Self-report questionnaires
Participants provided demographic data and completed the
Dickman Scale of Functional and Dysfunctional Impulsivity (DI),
which consists of 23 items assessing functional and DI factors,
with reported Cronbach’s alphas of 0.83 and 0.86, respectively
(Dickman, 1990). Functional Impulsivity (FI) is conceptualized
as a tendency to act with relatively little forethought when such
a strategy is advantageous, and is evaluated with questions such
as “I am good at taking advantage of unexpected opportuni-
ties, where you have to do something immediately or lose your
chance” and “I would enjoy working at a job that required me
to make a lot of split-second decisions.” DI is conceptualized as a
tendency to act with less forethought than most people of equal
ability when this tendency is a source of difficulty, and is assessed
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with questions such as “I frequently buy things without think-
ing about whether or not I can really afford them” and “I often
say and do things without considering the consequences.” Total
scores were calculated separately for FI and DI.
Participants also completed the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking
Scale (DOSPERT), which assesses individual differences in work-
related or personal decisions that involve risk and uncertainty
(Weber et al., 2002; Blais and Weber, 2006). The scale assesses
the likelihood of engaging in thirty risky behaviors across
five domains (ethics, financial, health/safety, recreational, and
social domains), and uses a 7-point rating scale ranging from
1 (Extremely Unlikely) to 7 (Extremely Likely). Sample items
include “Having an affair with a married man/woman” (Ethical);
“Betting a day’s income at the horse races” (Financial); “Engaging
in unprotected sex” (Health/Safety); “Taking a weekend sky-
diving class” (Recreational); and “Disagreeing with an authority
figure on a major issue” (Social). The DOSPERT questionnaire
was administered to provide a single index of risk-taking propen-
sity, which was calculated as the total score based on reported
likelihood of engaging in the 30 behaviors across five domains.
We used the total score of risk-taking propensity, rather than
domain subscale scores, given our sample size, as well as the lack
of evidence suggesting differences in ART or BART performance
as a function of risk-taking across domains (e.g., Recreational vs.
Social).
Behavioral data analysis
Three primary measures were calculated on the basis of task per-
formance for both the ART and the BART: Adjusted Presses,
Total Amount Earned, and Coefficient of Variation. The mea-
sure of “Adjusted Presses” reflected the mean number of choice
responses (Cast for ART and Pump for BART) made on rounds
that do not include a loss event (which otherwise would artifi-
cially restrict the range of risk behavior on that round). Adjusted
Presses is considered an index of risk-taking (Lejuez et al., 2002),
although it is alternatively considered to be an index of perfor-
mance strategy (Jentsch et al., 2010; Ashenhurst et al., 2011), as
it reflects how many trials—on average—that the participant is
willing to accept before cashing-out. “Total Amount Earned” is
the total amount of money and points earned in the ART and
BART, respectively, which reflects the subject’s ability to maxi-
mize reward receipt. The “Coefficient of Variation,” which is also
calculated from rounds that don’t include a loss event, is the stan-
dard deviation of the participant’s Adjusted Presses divided by the
mean of Adjusted Presses and reflects the subject’s variability in
responding. It has been suggested that a high coefficient of varia-
tion in a rodent model of the BART reflects combinations of both
higher than optimal and lower than optimal trial completions and
has been shown to index response strategy (Jentsch et al., 2010).
Pearson’s correlations were computed using R statistical software
(R 2.10.1) (http://www.r-project.org) in order to test the asso-
ciation between behavioral performance, Dickman scale factors,
and DOSPERT total scores. In order to address potential effects
of outliers, follow-up robust regression analyses were computed
when necessary. We present our correlation results uncorrected
for multiple comparisons given the exploratory nature of these
analyses and our small sample.
RESULTS
Given that our goal was to characterize the ART, and then to com-
pare neural activation elicited between the ART and BART, we
present results from our analyses of the ART imaging data, fol-
lowed by a comparison of the ART and BART contrasts. Note that
we present only the results of the BART analyses in relation to our
hypotheses about the ART, given recent and more extensive anal-
yses of the BART alone in other datasets (Schonberg et al., 2012;
Galvan et al., 2013).
ART GROUP CONTRASTS
Inspection of activation resulting from the mean Risky choice
contrast of the ART revealed activation only in right poste-
rior parietal and occipital regions (Table 2 and Figure 2A). In
contrast, the Risky choice Parametric contrast (which indexed
increasing activation across pumps within a round) revealed
activation in a paracingulate cluster spreading through the pre-
supplementary motor area (preSMA), superior frontal gyrus
(SFG), and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and ventrally to the
subcallosal and vmPFC, also extending bilaterally through the
inferior frontal regions, precentral gyri, and basal ganglia (includ-
ing NAcc, striatum, and thalamus) (Table 2 and Figure 2B).
Activation was also seen in bilateral frontal regions, the posterior
cingulate, bilateral posterior parietal regions, and occipital cortex.
There was no significant activation that was negatively associated
with pumps within a round.
Inspection of the mean Cash-out contrast of the ART, when
participants chose to end the round and collect their accumu-
lated earnings, revealed widespread activation spreading through
the cingulate/SMA/SFG, bilateral inferior frontal gyri spreading
through frontal poles and structures of the basal ganglia (includ-
ing thalamus, caudate, putamen, NAcc, and globus pallidus), in
addition to activation in the precentral gyrus, middle frontal
gyrus (MFG), frontal pole, and middle and inferior temporal
gyrus (Table 2 and Figure 2C). Inspection of activation from the
mean Loss contrast of the ART, when participants were pre-
sented with a red fish and lost their accumulated earnings for
that round, also revealed activation in the ACC spreading through
the paracingulate, preSMA and SFG, activation in bilateral thala-
mus, caudate, parahippocampal gyrus, IFG/insula/frontal orbital
regions, in addition to posterior parietal and occipital regions
(Table 2 and Figure 2D).
ART vs. BART GROUP CONTRASTS
The results of our primary analyses suggest that the version
of the ART used here engages brain regions known to be
involved in reward processing (for the Risky choice Parametric
contrast). In order to examine whether this pattern was spe-
cific to the ART (and its task parameters), or generalizable
to the BART (which has a less decomposable structure), we exam-
ined neural and behavioral correlates of the task in the same
sample of participants.
Given the lack vs. presence of ambiguity and changes in loss
probability in the ART and BART, respectively, we first com-
pared group-level mean Risky choice contrasts between tasks to
test the hypothesis that the addition of ambiguity and changes in
probability of gain and loss in the BART Risky choice trials would
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Table 2 | ART group contrasts.
Brain region Hemisphere Voxels Max z-statistic x y z
ART RISKY CHOICE
Superior parietal cortex, lateral occipital cortex R 623 3.85 28 −54 46
ART RISKY CHOICE PARAMETRIC
Paracingulate, preSMA, SFG, ACC, subcallosal cortex, PCC, precuneus,
medial and lateral frontal pole, thalamus, caudate, putamen, NAcc,
globus pallidus, insula, frontal orbital cortex, vmPFC, MFG, precentral
gyrus, cerebellum, occipital cortex
R/L 37183 5.83 2 22 38
Posterior parietal cortex R 748 3.93 50 −40 52
Posterior parietal cortex L 520 4.07 −40 −42 48
ART CASH-OUT
Posterior parietal cortex, occipital cortex, precuneus, cerebellum, PCC,
preSMA, SFG, paracingulate, ACC, frontal pole, thalamus, caudate,
putamen, NAcc, globus pallidus, insula, frontal operculum, IFG, frontal
orbital cortex, MFG, precentral gyrus, frontal pole, middle and inferior
temporal gyrus
R/L 79621 5.63 50 −34 44
ART LOSS
Occipital cortex, cerebellum, precuneus, posterior parietal cortex,
middle temporal gyrus, parahippocampal gyrus, thalamus, caudate
R/L 26384 6.14 28 −70 −14
Frontal orbital cortex, insula, IFG, MFG, precentral gyrus R 2579 4.84 32 18 −14
SFG, preSMA, paracingulate, ACC R/L 2458 4.18 4 32 46
Insula, frontal orbital cortex, frontal operculum, IFG, precentral gyrus L 969 4.36 −34 16 −8
Voxels: number of activated voxels per cluster (or region within cluster); z-stat: maximum z-statistic for each cluster; x, y, z are MNI coordinates for the peak of each
cluster. ART, Angling Risk Task; R, right; L, left; preSMA, presupplementary motor area; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; PCC, posterior
cingulate cortex; NAcc, nucleus accumbens; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; MFG, middle frontal gyrus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus.
FIGURE 2 | ART group contrasts. (A) Risky choice; (B) Risky choice
Parametric; (C) Cash-out; and (D) Loss contrasts (vs. Baseline). All
contrasts are corrected for whole-brain multiple comparisons; statistical
maps were projected onto an average cortical surface using CARET (Right
hemisphere = Right side of the image). The color scale represents z-score.
be evident in increased neural activation in frontal, cingulate, and
striatal regions. We examined the conjunction of activation for
both tasks, which revealed that there was no overlapping acti-
vation for the mean Risky choice contrast between BART and
ART. We directly contrasted group maps between tasks, reveal-
ing significantly greater activation in bilateral occipital regions in
the ART vs. BART mean Risky choice contrast, which extended
into superior parietal regions (Table 3 and Figure 3A). We found
significantly greater activation in a fronto-cingulate cluster in
the BART vs. ART mean Risky choice contrast, with activa-
tion extending from the SMA, preSMA, SFG, and paracingulate
through the ACC (Table 3 and Figure 3B).
We next compared group-level Risky choice Parametric con-
trasts between tasks to test the hypothesis that the lack of ambi-
guity (and stationary gain and loss probabilities) in the ART
Risky choice Parametric contrast—as compared to the BART
Risky choice parametric contrast—would be evident in increased
activation within a valuation network (including the ventral stria-
tum and medial prefrontal cortex). A conjunction of activation
for both tasks revealed overlapping activations in only bilateral
occipital regions between BART and ARTRisky choice Parametric
contrasts (Table 3 and Figure 4A). The ART, as compared to
BART, Risky choice Parametric contrast revealed significantly
greater activation in the bilateral NAcc, striatum, globus pallidus,
thalamic nuclei, insula, IFG, and frontal orbital cortex, in addition
to a paracingulate cluster extending to the vmPFC, frontal pole,
and ACC (Table 3 and Figure 4B). In contrast, no region showed
significantly greater activation for the Risky choice Parametric
contrast for BART as compared to ART.
EXPLORATORY INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES ANALYSES
We conducted a number of exploratory follow-up analyses in
order to further characterize the pattern of individual differ-
ences evident during performance of the ART, as compared to
the BART. These analyses are strictly exploratory and caution
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Table 3 | Contrasts between ART and BART tasks.
Brain region Hemisphere Voxels Max z- statistic x y z
ART vs. BART RISKY CHOICE
Occipital cortex, precuneus, superior parietal cortex R/L 21169 6.14 30 −82 20
BART vs. ART RISKY CHOICE
preSMA, SMA, paracingulate, ACC, SFG R/L 936 4.68 −4 0 54
ART vs. BART RISKY CHOICE PARAMETRIC
Caudate, putamen, NAcc, thalamus, preSMA, paracingulate, ACC,
frontal orbital cortex, frontal pole, vmPFC, insula, IFG, frontal operculum
R/L 7505 4.67 14 8 4
Occipital pole, cerebellum R/L 4658 4.59 20 −92 −8
Frontal pole, MFG R 1505 4.02 32 58 24
Cerebellum R/L 620 3.45 −4 −54 −38
MFG, SFG, precentral gyrus R 338 3.60 34 10 60
BART vs. ART RISKY CHOICE PARAMETRIC
(no greater activation) – – – – – –
Voxels: number of activated voxels per cluster (or region within cluster); z-stat: maximum z-statistic for each cluster; x, y, z are MNI coordinates for the peak of each
cluster. BART, Balloon Analog Risk Task; ART, Angling Risk Task; R, right; L, left; preSMA, presupplementary motor area; SMA, supplementary motor area; ACC,
anterior cingulate cortex; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; NAcc, nucleus accumbens; vmPFC, ventromedial prefrontal cortex; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; MFG, middle
frontal gyrus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus.
FIGURE 3 | Risky choice contrast. (A) ART vs. BART group contrast; (B)
BART vs. ART group contrast. All contrasts are corrected for whole-brain
multiple comparisons; statistical maps were projected onto an average
cortical surface using CARET (Right hemisphere = Right side of the image).
The color scale represents z-score.
must be used when interpreting them given our small sample
size. Descriptive statistics of sample demographics, self-report
scores and task performance are presented in Table 1, and cross-
correlation matrices are presented in Table 4.
Individual differences analysis of behavioral data
In terms of ART performance measures, mean Adjusted Presses
and Total Amount Earned were positively correlated (r = 0.74,
p < 0.0001), indicating that a response strategy that was char-
acterized by a higher number of average presses per round was
optimal insofar as it resulted in a higher total payoff. Stated
differently, individuals who made few casts on the “sunny-day,
catch-and-release” version of the ART failed to optimize their per-
formance and ended up making less on the task than those who
pressed more.
Risk-taking propensity, based on total DOSPERT scores, was
negatively correlated with ARTTotal Amount Earned (r = −0.53,
p = 0.01), with a trend for a negative correlation with ART mean
Adjusted Presses (r = −0.41, p = 0.05). In line with our behav-
ioral data—which indicate that an optimal response strategy is
FIGURE 4 | Risky choice Parametric contrast. (A) Conjunction between
BART and ART; (B) ART vs. BART group contrast. All contrasts are
corrected for whole-brain multiple comparisons; statistical maps were
projected onto an average cortical surface using CARET (Right hemisphere
= Right side of the image). The color scale represents z-score.
characterized by more presses and, as a result, a higher payoff—
those individuals that adopted an optimal response strategy
(more presses, more earnings) were also lower in self-reported
naturalistic risk-taking. Stated differently, individuals who made
few casts, and earned less, on the “sunny-day, catch-and-release”
version of the ART also report engaging in more risk-taking
behaviors. ART performance was not, however, significantly asso-
ciated with either FI or DI (p > 0.05) in our small sample.
Within the BART, the mean Adjusted Presses and Coefficient
of Variation were correlated (r = −0.42, p = 0.05), indicating
that participants who pumped more on each balloon were less
variable in their response strategy than those who made fewer
pumps; this correlation was marginally different between the
BART and ART (p = 0.06). However, neither of these two BART
performance measures was correlated with the Total Amount
Earned on the BART. [Note that Adjusted Presses and Total
Amount Earned were not perfectly correlated, as our index
of Adjusted Presses is the average number of balloon pumps
across all trials (in rounds that did not result in an explosion);
while the total number of Adjusted Presses is identical to the
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Table 4 | Correlations among individual differences measures.
DI DOSPERT Adjusted presses Total amount earned Coefficient of variation ART NAcc %sc ART vmPFC %sc
ART
FI 0.22 0.04 0.18 −0.02 −0.10 −0.27 −0.19
DI – 0.27 −0.29 −0.19 −0.11 0.54* 0.16
DOSPERT – – −0.41† −0.53* −0.17 0.35 0.39†
Adjusted presses – – – 0.74* 0.15 −0.59* −0.38†
Total amount earned – – – – 0.14 −0.47* −0.39†
Coefficient of variation – – – – – 0.06 0.17
ART NAcc %sc – – – – – – 0.52*
Adjusted presses Total amount earned Coefficient of variation BART NAcc %sc BART vmPFC %sc
BART
FI 0.39+ 0.04 −0.52* 0.05 0.007
DI 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.20 −0.23
DOSPERT −0.21 0.03 0.08 −0.49* −0.50*
Adjusted presses – 0.02 −0.42* 0.32 0.22
Total amount earned – – −0.19 0.20 −0.15
Coefficient of variation – – – −0.19 −0.04
BART NAcc %sc – – – – 0.56
*p < 0.05; †Trend-level association (p-value between 0.05 and 0.07). %sc = percent signal change.
Total Amount Earned on both tasks, the number of presses that
the participants makes—on average—across the course of the
task provides an index of their strategy and presumably gauges
their risk tolerance.] In contrast with the ART, performance on
the BART correlated with trait impulsivity: BART Coefficient
of Variation negatively correlated with Functional Impulsivity
(r = −0.52, p = 0.01) and Adjusted Pressesmarginally correlated
with Functional Impulsivity (r = 0.39, p = 0.06), suggesting that
individuals high in FI adopted an optimal and consistent response
strategy on the task.
Finally, to confirm that our measures of mean Adjusted Presses
indexed the general pattern of individual differences in perfor-
mance across the course of the task (despite variation indexed by
Coefficient of Variation), we examined the relationship between
Adjusted Presses and the total number of presses across all tri-
als (including Risky-Choice, Cash-out, and Loss trials); note that
these Results are not included in Table 4. For both tasks, mean
Adjusted Presses was positively correlated with total number of
presses across the entire task: ART (r = 0.81, p < 0.0001) and
BART (r = 0.51, p = 0.01). Furthermore, the pattern of results
remained the same when substituting total number of presses for
mean Adjusted Presses in relation to Total Amount Earned and
Coefficient of Variation (except in one case, where total num-
ber of presses was marginally significantly correlated with Total
Amount Earned (p = 0.056), whereas mean Adjusted Presses
was not significantly correlated with Total Amount Earned on
the BART). These results suggest that mean Adjusted Presses in
each task is a valid indicator of the subject’s overall performance
across the course of the task, while Coefficient of Variability
indexes the degree to which subject’s varied from this pattern on
Risky-Choice trials across the course of the task.
To summarize, based on an exploratory analysis of the
ART behavioral data alone, our data suggest that an optimal
performance strategy is reflected in a high number of mean
Adjusted Presses as this results in a corresponding high Total
Amount Earned. This response pattern is associated with lower
rates of self-reported risk-taking, contrary to some previous find-
ings (Pleskac, 2008). Based on the BART behavioral data, partici-
pants that pumped more were also less variable in their response
strategy, indicating a consistent response strategy. Those individ-
uals that pumped more on the BART, and were less variable in the
number of pumps across the task, were also more likely to score
high on a self-report measure of functional impulsivity, which is
proposed to capture an advantageous response style. Although
previous studies have reported an association between increased
pumping on the BART and higher self-reported risk taking
(Lejuez et al., 2003a,b, 2004, 2007), this is the first investigation of
performance and ameasure that distinguishes between functional
and dysfunctional impulsivity.
Individual differences analysis of ART imaging data
To test the hypothesis that reward-related neural activity in a risky
setting would be related to individual difference measures, we: (1)
extracted percent signal change from anatomically-defined NAcc
and vmPFC ROIs for the group Risky choice Parametric contrast;
and (2) correlated activation in these ROIs with our individ-
ual differences measures. Our individual differences measures
included our three primary performance measures (Adjusted
Presses, Total Amount Earned, and Coefficient of Variation), trait
impulsivity (DI and FI), and naturalistic risk-taking (DOSPERT
scores). Percent signal change extracted from the right NAcc was
negatively correlated with ART Adjusted Presses (r = −0.59, p =
0.003, Figure 5, top left panel) and Total Amount Earned (r =
−0.47, p = 0.02, Figure 5, middle left panel), while percent signal
change extracted from the vmPFC was marginally negatively
correlated with ART Adjusted Presses (r = −0.38, p = 0.07,
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FIGURE 5 | Relationship between risk-taking performance, impulsivity,
risk-taking propensity and Risky choice Parametric activation. Average
percent signal change (psc) values extracted from the right nucleus
accumbens (R NAcc) negatively correlate with ART average Adjusted
Presses (top left panel) and Total Amount Earned (middle left panel), and
positively correlate with Dysfunctional Impulsivity scores (bottom left
panel), suggesting that increased reward-tracking activation is associated
with poorer performance on the ART and higher impulsivity. A similar
pattern is seen in average percent signal change (psc) values extracted
from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), although at trend level:
vmPFC activation negatively correlates with ART average Adjusted Presses
(top right panel) and Total Amount Earned (middle right panel). vmPFC
activation also marginally positively correlates with DOSPERT scores
(bottom right panel), suggesting that increased reward-tracking activation is
associated with a greater likelihood of engaging in risky behaviors.
Activation represents the ART Risky choice Parametric contrast as
intersected with our two anatomical ROIs, as described in the text. The
vmPFC anatomical mask is presented in yellow, and significant ART Risky
choice Parametric activation within this mask is presented in blue. ART
Risky choice Parametric activation overlapped with the entire R NAcc
mask: these voxels are presented in red. R = Right. For the sagittal view,
X = 41; for the axial view, Z = 34.
Figure 5, top right panel) and Total Amount Earned (r = −0.39,
p = 0.07, Figure 5, middle right panel). These results indicate
that greater reward-related neural activity is associated with a
suboptimal response strategy in our sample. In line with these
findings, percent signal change extracted from the right NAcc
was positively correlated with DI (r = 0.54, p = 0.008, bottom
left panel Figure 5), and percent signal change extracted from
the vmPFC was marginally positively correlated with total risk-
taking (r = 0.39, p = 0.07, bottom right panel Figure 5), further
indicating that greater reward-sensitive neural activity is associ-
ated with a self-reported disadvantageous response style and high
likelihood of taking risks. For illustration, these relationships are
presented in Figure 5 along with a map illustrating the extent of
activation in the Risky choice Parametric contrast when inter-
sected with our NAcc and vmPFC anatomically-defined ROIs.
The anatomically-defined vmPFC mask is displayed in yellow;
activation in the Risky choice Parametric contrast, within this
vmPFC ROI, is displayed in blue. The right NAcc mask and Risky
choice Parametric activation completely overlapped: this activa-
tion is presented in red. Percent signal change in these two ROIs
was not significantly associated with any of our other individual
differences measures.
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Individual differences analysis of BART
As a follow-up comparison, percent signal change was extracted
from our anatomically-defined ROIs for the BART Risky choice
Parametric contrast: while DOSPERT scores negatively corre-
lated with percent signal change extracted for the Risky choice
Parametric contrast from the right NAcc (r = −0.49, p = 0.02),
and from the vmPFC (r = −0.50, p = 0.01), these findings
must be considered in light of the fact that this vmPFC activa-
tion was not significant in the group contrast and were strictly
exploratory.
DISCUSSION
We conducted an investigation of the ART in a sample of
healthy adults in order to characterize the neural correlates of
performance on this risky decision-making task, and compare
with activation elicited by the BART. The version of the ART
used here [named “sunny-day, catch-and-release” in the origi-
nal paper by Pleskac (2008)] represents decision-making under
risk without ambiguity, and these results suggest that its decom-
posable task structure is associated with distinct patterns of
neural activation. Specifically, (1) mean activation during Risky
choice trials is only seen in right posterior parietal and occipi-
tal regions, which is consistent with a comparison of decision-
making under risk vs. ambiguity, in which risk preference was
correlated specifically with activation in the posterior parietal cor-
tex (Huettel et al., 2006); (2) activation during the Risky choice
Parametric contrast (which indexes increasing activation across
pumps within a round) is evident in regions known to play a role
in reward processing; and (3) activation seen during Cash-out
and Loss trials is also consistent with previous reports of corre-
sponding contrasts of the BART task (Rao et al., 2008; Claus and
Hutchison, 2012).
In order to examine the specificity of this risk-taking profile,
we compared neural activation associated with the ART to that
elicited by the BART. We report increased fronto-cingulate acti-
vation during BART as compared to ART Risky choice trials, and
suggest that this increased activation may be driven by the pres-
ence of ambiguity in the BART. This view is supported by previous
fMRI investigations of ambiguity, which have demonstrated the
recruitment of insular and lateral prefrontal activity with increas-
ing uncertainty (Huettel et al., 2005, 2006; Krain et al., 2006).
However, our results do not map precisely onto those of Hsu
et al. (2005), who compared conditions of ambiguity vs. risk,
and demonstrated that the orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, and
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex were sensitive to ambiguity. This
discrepancy may be driven by the qualitative differences in the
contrasts of BART vs. ART Risky choice trials and the contrast of
ambiguity vs. risk trials as presented by Hsu et al. (2005), or our
relative lack of power to detect additional activation sensitive to
ambiguity in the BART.
We also report greater activation for the ART as compared to
BART Risky choice Parametric contrast, and suggest that this is
indicative of tracking of reward, driven in particular by the lack
of ambiguity, in the ART. That is, as probability is known and sta-
ble across Risky choice trials in the ART, participants are expected
to be able to track accumulated reward value; in contrast, Risky
choice trials vary in both positive potential gain, loss, and proba-
bility of each balloon (represented by an increase in size) in the
BART. The only change across the course of Risky choice tri-
als in the ART is the increasing value of accumulated earnings,
and this is reflected by significantly greater activation in a val-
uation network, both as compared to baseline and BART Risky
choice Parametric events. We report widespread activation for
parametrically weighted Risky choice trials in the ART, but not
the BART, through bilateral accumbens and vmPFC extending
through other structures of the basal ganglia and cingulate, as
well as bilateral lateral prefrontal cortex. These findings are con-
sistent with the known role of these regions in tracking reward
value (Jocham et al., 2011; Liu et al., 2011) and are consistent
with previous reports of ventral striatal activation when choosing
risky options, in contrast to safe or control options, in a decision-
making task (Weber andHuettel, 2008). Overall, these results sug-
gest that the ART allows for successful isolation of reward tracking
through the course of a sequential risky decision-making task.
In addition to isolating neural correlates of component pro-
cesses of risky decision-making, our exploratory analyses of indi-
vidual differences suggest that while ART performance is not
associated with trait impulsivity, ART performance is associ-
ated with naturalistic risk-taking. In our small sample of healthy
adults, a more beneficial strategy—characterized by more presses
and a corresponding higher payoff—was associated with less
self-reported risk-taking. That is, given the range of respond-
ing seen in our sample, a higher number of Adjusted Presses
in our sample was reflective of a better response strategy, and
not [as originally reported by Lejuez et al. (2002)] indicative of
suboptimal decision-making, because in the “sunny-day, catch-
and-release” context of this ART version, making a higher number
of Adjusted Presses was the optimal response strategy. Based on
a single index of risk-taking propensity (DOSPERT scores), the
Total Amount Earned on the ART was significantly correlated
(and mean Adjusted Presses marginally correlated) with natu-
ralistic risk-taking, meaning that participants who performed
better on this risky decision-making task also viewed themselves
as less likely to engage in risky behaviors than participants who
failed to adopt an optimal response strategy. Stated differently,
performance on the ART was sensitive to individual differences
in naturalistic risk-taking, with poor performers more likely to
engage in naturalistic risk-taking.
Our findings are somewhat in line with those originally
reported in the development of the ART (Pleskac, 2008).
Specifically, Pleskac compared different version of the ART,
including the sunny day (no ambiguity) and cloudy day
(with ambiguity) versions and reported a significant correlation
between performance in the sunny day version and self-reported
risky use of drugs, but no correlation between performance
on the cloudy day version and risky drug use. Thus, on the
one hand, our findings extend Pleskac’s initial conclusion that
an ambiguity requirement hinders the predictive validity of the
ART. However, Pleskac reported a positive correlation between
mean Adjusted Presses and a weighted measure of poly-drug use,
whereas we report a negative association between mean Adjusted
Presses and self-reported risk-taking across multiple domains of
behavior. These sets of findings may suggest that the lack of
ambiguity is central to detecting relationships between individ-
ual differences in performance and self-report. However, it has
also been reported that a fewer number of pumps on the BART
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is associated with less risk-taking (as indicated by a measure of
alcohol use and related problems) (Ashenhurst et al., 2011); this
finding is consistent with our results based on the ART, but in
contrast to previous reports of the BART (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002).
In addition to differences in the direction of the relationship
between task performance and risk-taking, the various indica-
tors of naturalistic risk-taking vary across studies and caution
must be used when comparing across such diverse studies; that
is, specific measures of poly-drug (Pleskac, 2008) or alcohol use
(Ashenhurst et al., 2011) are not equivalent to the composite mea-
sure of work-related or personal decisions that involve risk and
uncertainty (used here). Overall, these discrepancies indicate that
further research on this topic is warranted.
Neural activation during performance of the ART was asso-
ciated with both naturalistic risk-taking and trait impulsivity.
During ART Risky choice trials, activation from the right NAcc
and vmPFC increased with reward values across the course of the
task. Increased activation in these regions was related to subop-
timal task performance (lower than optimal number of Adjusted
Presses and less money earned), higher dysfunctional impulsivity,
and a higher risk-taking propensity. Our results therefore suggest
that activation associated with increasing reward in the ART is
associated with poorer decision-making performance in this risky
context and with a greater likelihood of engaging in risky behav-
iors. These regions (NAcc and vmPFC) form part of a valuation
network, which is engaged during reward-processing across a
range of paradigms (for a review, see Liu et al., 2011), and shows
an increase in activation as a function of both reward magnitude
(Knutson et al., 2001; Peters and Buchel, 2010) and impulsiv-
ity (Hariri et al., 2006; Hahn et al., 2009; Jimura et al., 2013).
While preliminary, these findings illustrate a specific context in
which behavior, trait impulsivity, and self-reported naturalistic
risk-taking are correlated, and may help to clarify mixed findings
regarding the relationship between impulsivity and decision-
making task performance (broadly defined) (Zermatten et al.,
2005; Perales et al., 2009; Billieux et al., 2010; Bayard et al., 2011).
These findings of a relationship between reward-related acti-
vation and DI, as well as risk-taking propensity, are consistent
with previously reported associations between both risk-taking
traits and behaviors with activation in brain regions engaged dur-
ing risky decision-making: specifically, ventral striatal response
during reward anticipation and receipt has been positively asso-
ciated with sensation-seeking scores in healthy adolescents (Bjork
et al., 2008), risk-taking propensity in healthy adolescents (Galvan
et al., 2007), and psychopathic personality traits, particularly an
impulsive-antisocial factor, in adults (Buckholtz et al., 2010).
Similarly, medial prefrontal activation during reward processing
has been positively associated with psychosocial symptoms on
a Drug Use Screening Inventory in healthy adolescents (Bjork
et al., 2011). However, we demonstrate that pattern here with
a task that is also decomposable into component processes
underlying decision-making. Taken as a whole, these findings
suggest that individuals that are more sensitive to reward—
as indexed by heightened ventral striatal and medial prefrontal
activation when tracking reward, as well as higher DI and
self-reported risk-taking—perform suboptimally in the face of
unambiguous reward. We speculate that the enhanced reward-
related neural activity is part of an imbalance between systems
underlying decision-making, as several recent lines of evidence
demonstrate altered connectivity between valuation and control
networks (Cox et al., 2010; Helfinstein et al., under review), as
well as less online, but more offline, activity (Hahn et al., 2011;
Shannon et al., 2011) in individuals with high impulsivity or
risk-taking propensity. It is therefore possible that ventral stri-
atal and medial prefrontal activity is biased toward tracking of
reward in certain individuals, and that this bias underlies subopti-
mal decision-making (as measured using the ART), predisposing
an individual to act with less forethought (DI) and an increased
likelihood of engaging in high-risk behaviors (as measured by
the DOSPERT). This is speculative insofar as we are inferring
that high ventral striatal and medial prefrontal activation elicited
by the Risky-choice Parametric contrast is specific to reward
processing in the context of a complex decision-making task.
One major limitation of our primary analyses is that all par-
ticipants completed the ART after having completed the BART,
although the time between scans varied across participants [mean
time difference in days was 229.87 (SD = 181.75)] and the time
difference between scans was not correlated with any variable
examined in our analyses. The wide range of task parameters used
in the literature, for both BART and ART, makes a comparison to
previously reported results difficult. However, the distribution of
performance summary measures reported here is relatively con-
sistent with those reported previously (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002;
Pleskac, 2008), suggesting that performance strategies did not
drastically shift between testing sessions. Nonetheless, the influ-
ence of order effects cannot be excluded. Furthermore, the tasks
differ in important ways: the tasks involve different metaphors,
participants played for points in the BART, while they played for
pennies in the ART, and the BART task alone included a con-
trol condition. While risk is explicit and stable in the ART, the
potential increasing reward, loss, and probability of risk varies
across BART trials, making it difficult to separate out which of
these parameters is driving neural correlates of what we are label-
ing as ambiguity here. Thus, while the current investigation has
attempted to compare tasks that differ on a set of hypothesized
component processes (e.g., ambiguity), we cannot rule out addi-
tional differences in task parameters that may account for our
results.
There are significant limitations to acknowledge in our
exploratory analyses: in particular, as the small sample size leaves
us underpowered, the reported associations are not corrected
for multiple comparisons. Our goal in these exploratory anal-
yses was to supplement our primary analyses of the ART, and
comparison of the ART and BART. This is the first exami-
nation of the neural correlates of the ART and as such, we
sought to help with the interpretation of increasing Risky
Choice parametric activation by examining its relationship with
between task performance, individual difference measures of
impulsivity, and self-reported risk-taking. Although underpow-
ered and exploratory, and although the absence of significant
relationships may also be driven by a lack of power, we offer
these results as preliminary evidence in support of a distinct
risk-taking profile that may be better captured by the ART, and
hope to stimulate additional research. Another limitation is the
use a single measure of risk-taking propensity (i.e., DOSPERT
total risk-taking propensity vs. subscale scores), given the lack of
Frontiers in Neuroscience | Decision Neuroscience September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 173 | 12
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evidence suggesting differences in ART or BART performance as
a function of risk-taking across domains (e.g., Recreational vs.
Social) and given the relatively small sample size. This represents
an area for follow-up investigation and evidence characterizing
differences as a function of risk-taking across domains will further
contribute to the characterization of how individual differences
in impulsivity and risky decision-making relates to naturalistic
risk-taking. Overall, additional work in larger samples charac-
terized by a broader range of trait impulsivity is needed to
characterize how the task parameters of both the ART and BART
relate to individual differences in trait impulsivity and naturalistic
risk-taking.
Results reported here suggest that the ART, which is decom-
posable and associated with distinct patterns of neural acti-
vation, is also associated with individual differences in trait
DI and naturalistic risk-taking. The lack of ambiguity, paired
with the presence of affective features, enables participants to
track reward value across trials explicitly, which is most evi-
dent in those who have a heightened sensitivity to reward. This
reward sensitivity correlates with self-reported DI and a global
measure of self-reported naturalistic risk-taking propensity. In
contrast, our results suggest that the presence of ambiguity
in the BART obscures a participant’s ability to assign poten-
tial accumulated reward, and as a result, elicits a suboptimal
response strategy—all of which mask the relationship between
performance and naturalistic risk-taking. As performance on the
ART—but not BART—is associated with self-reported naturalis-
tic risk-taking, this characterization of the ART represents a step
toward identifying a risk-taking profile, and of being able to use
behavioral measures of risky decision-making to predict natural-
istic risk-taking. These findings are in line with the overarching
goal of this line of research, which is to identify mechanisms that
predispose an individual to high-risk behaviors, thereby enabling
the prediction, and in turn, the prevention, of risk behaviors that
carry high levels of morbidity and mortality (e.g., fast driving)
or that contribute to the symptomatology of clinical illness (e.g.,
substance dependence). However, our small sample requires that
caution must be used when drawing conclusions based on these
initial results and future studies are needed to replicate and extend
these findings.
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